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Who you gonna call? – Oligarchic Clans as a Bottom-up Force of 
Neighborhood Europeanization in Ukraine 
Inna Melnykovska1 and Rainer Schweickert2  
 
 
Abstract3 
 
 
This paper argues that, in the absence of a strong membership incentive within the European 
Neighborhood Policy (ENP), a top-down institutional convergence of CIS countries towards 
European standards – i.e. democracy and market economy – is unlikely to be successful. 
However, due to enlargement fatigue within the EU, the membership incentive is off the 
agenda for the CIS. Hence, the ENP has to initiate or to speed up a bottom-up institutional 
convergence by identifying bottom-up domestic forces that are willing and able to drive the 
convergence in a particular country. Ukraine, whose oligarchic clans are the main bottom-up 
forces behind institution building, is a case in point. After having supported the first wave of 
institutional reforms during the Orange Revolution, these bottom-up forces are facing great 
difficulties in forming sustainable coalitions for further institutional reforms. The paper shows 
that the EU could, by providing economic incentives rather than the membership incentive, 
exploit the strong business interests of the oligarchic clans in the EU markets and EU 
investment to motivate them to jointly drive institutional convergence from the bottom-up. 
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oligarchic clans 
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1. Introduction 
 
Institutional convergence towards European standards/values, i.e. building EU-style 
institutions, in any particular post-communist country can theoretically run two ways: bottom-
up and top-down. Democratic governments may implement institutional reforms in a top-down 
way without wide domestic support in the population or the elite. A top-down convergence 
would be less complex, as governments would not have to spend time and effort finding 
domestic support. However, such convergence would be highly risky, especially if institution 
building causes high social costs. Hence, top-down institution building might be easier if the 
strong external incentive of EU membership were provided, which would make the bitter pill 
of convergence easier to swallow for those who stand to loose by balancing social pressure 
with other, e.g. geo-political, benefits. Alternatively, the wide support of some institutional 
change by the population or by the elite can induce governments to achieve institutional 
convergence in a bottom-up way. Such convergence would be more sustainable, as the 
resulting European-style institutions would be home grown. Convergence in a bottom-up way 
would proceed slowly, but could be speeded up by providing some external incentives for the 
population or for the elite. 
Indeed, the success of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in the top-
down building of European-style institutions is often attributed to EU membership incentive 
these countries enjoyed. The concept of convergence  ̶  not only, but also of institutions  ̶  is 
tightly integrated in the process of EU enlargement (Schweickert 2004). The institutional 
convergence of the CEECs, often labeled “Enlargement Europeanization”, has resulted in the 
most massive transfer of European institutions in recent history (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmaier 2005; Pop-Eleches 2007).1 When accepting ten CEECs as new members, the EU 
established the Copenhagen Criteria for membership, including standards of criteria on 
institutional quality, and provided financial and technical assistance to bring down the social 
costs of institutional convergence towards these common standards (Gawrich and Schweickert 
2004; Raik 2005; Roland 2005). To fulfill EU institutional standards, the candidate countries 
must demonstrate political stability, including maintaining of human rights and protection of 
minorities (political criteria); implement the aquis communautaire into national legislation and 
adopt the goals of the political, economic and monetary union (legal criteria); and have a fully 
functioning market economy (economic criteria). Truly, the EU has been successful until now 
in its enlargement strategy, as there is a large consensus on the favorable role of the EU in 
promoting democracy and economic development by fostering a top-down institution building 
in most CEECs (Gawrich and Schweickert 2004; Raik 2005; Roland 2006).  
In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the top-down institutional 
convergence towards European standards and values has lagged behind. Unlike in the CEECs, 
comparable Europeanization mechanisms – incentives, compensations, linkages, direct 
financial support, etc. – to implement European institutions have not been available in the CIS.. 
The EU did not give these countries a membership incentive and concentrated more on 
economic cooperation than on institutional convergence. Furthermore, the other international 
organizations acting in the CIS targeted macroeconomic stability and expected institutions to 
be built as by-product of the macroeconomic reforms. Only in the second half of the 1990s did 
the disappointing outcomes of political reforms, as well as the economic stagnation and crises 
in the CIS and in developing countries, give rise to a great number of studies on the reasons for 
the mistakes made in the design of the reforms (Hellmann 1998; Unmüsig and Walther 1999; 
Rodrik 2000, 2003, 2006; Schweickert und Thiele 2004).2 These studies conclude that building 
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European-style institutions is crucial to successful political reforms and sustainable economic 
growth in the CIS and lead international lending organizations, governments and investors to 
rethink the importance of institutions. 
It is obvious that the EU as one of the influential international actors in institution 
building in the region would speed up top-down institutional convergence towards European 
values and standards in the CIS by offering a membership perspective for the neighboring CIS 
countries. However, after Eastern enlargement has been completed with the recent accession of 
Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the “carrot” of membership to push for institutional 
development in transition countries is currently reserved for the Western Balkan states 
exclusively. For the post-Soviet space as well as for Mediterranean countries, the EU has 
created a new instrument, the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).  
The ENP clearly demonstrates the EU’s interest in “the ring of well-governed states”3 that 
would respect European democratic, market and legal institutions, but has limited potential to 
push for institutional convergence towards European standards in a top-down way. In the 
absence of a strong membership incentive, a top-down institutional convergence is unlikely to 
be successful. “Neighborhood Europeanization” has to rely on the European Neighborhood 
Policy Action Plans (ENP APs) together with financial assistance to cut the social costs of 
institution building under the new European Neighborhood Policy Instrument (ENPI). As 
argued in Gawrich et al. (2008), the incentives and compensations provided by the ENP are 
well-suited to a top-down approach, but a top-down approach could only work in the CIS if the 
membership incentive were provided, as it was to the CEECs, which have successfully 
converged as a result. 
In the absence a strong membership incentive, democratic institutions and a stable market 
economy have to be bottom-up to survive changes in the political and economic sphere (Rumer 
2005). The so-called color revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and the Kyrgyz Republic 
exemplified the potential of these countries to converge towards European standards in a 
bottom-up way. The wide support for institutional convergence by the population and by the 
elite has induced the government to introduce formal legislative standards and to narrow the 
institutional gap between the EU and these countries. Such a bottom-up convergence proceeds 
slowly, but could be speeded up by the EU. 
This paper argues that, the EU’s external incentives for institutional development in the 
CIS can only work if there is a net benefit for domestic forces to converge in a bottom-up way 
towards EU standards. Hence, the ENP has to rely more on appropriate incentives and 
mechanisms to push for a bottom-up convergence by identifying the domestic bottom-up forces 
that are willing and able to drive institution building in a particular country. The EU should 
design ENP incentives and mechanisms such that they exploit the political and economic 
preferences of these domestic forces to bring about institutional convergence. Because the 
strength of the EU is its position as a global economic player, economic incentives have to play 
the most important role in this regard.4  
Ukraine, which has expressed a keen interest in becoming member of the EU, but which 
is not being considered for membership by the EU, is a case in point. The Orange Revolution 
clearly revealed Ukraine’s potential to adopt the fundamental European values of democracy, 
market economy, human rights and the Acquis communautaire, a potential that can be 
exploited by the ENP (Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006). However, the unified domestic forces that 
ended Kuchma’s repressive regime failed to build any consistent coalition after the common 
goal of overcoming reform gridlock and building minimal institutional standards was achieved 
and the EU did not offer Ukraine the strong incentive of membership. As a consequence, 
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Ukraine’s reform capacity to converge in a top-down way that would go hand in hand with 
enthusiastic expectations that EU membership would be granted in the aftermath of the Orange 
Revolutions has decreased considerably (Fischer et al. 2008, White et al. 2008). However, the 
EU still has the possibilities to push for a bottom-up institutional convergence in Ukraine. It 
can use economic incentives to motivate the oligarchic clans that are the main bottom-up forces 
behind institution building in Ukraine to jointly drive institutional convergence, since these 
clans are strongly interested in EU markets and its investment.  
We proceed by showing that the oligarchic clans have been and are still the main 
(potential) internal drivers of a bottom-up institutional convergence in Ukraine (Section 2). 
Combining the theories of Oleh Havrylyshyn (2006a) and Mancur Olson (2000), Section 3 
takes a closer look at the political and economic preferences of the oligarchic clans and the way 
they are changing under the influence of globalization. Section 4 concentrates on Ukraine’s 
trade with and investment from the EU, thereby identifying the EU’s potential leverage to 
exploit the changing preferences of the rent-seeking oligarchic clans in Ukraine and to 
engender the bottom-up convergence of Ukraine’s institutions towards EU standards. Finally, 
Section 5 summarizes and draws conclusions for “Neighborhood Europeanization” under ENP. 
 
2. Oligarchic Structures as Domestic Forces behind Institution 
Building in Ukraine 
The population or the elite are the domestic forces that drive a bottom-up institutional 
convergence. The population may participate in “intermediary” non-state organizations, such as 
professional associations, religious groups, labor unions and citizen advocacy organizations to 
articulate their preferences for better institutions and push democratic governments for 
institutional convergence. A population organized in such a way is often referred to as a civil 
society. In their turn, the elite in such a society may found lobby organizations or create 
networks with politicians (often part of elite) to push for institution building. Theoretically, 
civil society is assumed to be even more important for a bottom-up convergence than the elite.  
Civil society, however, has not been the main bottom-up force in Ukraine. Public choice 
was neither a driving nor constraining force of institution building during the early transition 
years (Howard 2002; McFaul 2002). CIS countries had the least participatory civil societies in 
the world (Howard 2002; World Values Survey 2004) and their civil societies were regarded as 
weak and passive (this was also true for Ukraine).5 The studies on the civil society in Ukraine 
define the mass demonstrations during the Orange Revolution in 2004-2005 as spontaneous 
popular protests based upon social dissatisfaction with the incumbent political regime, but not 
the activities of a developed and established civil society (Stepanenko 2006). While these 
studies differ on the importance of the mass demonstrations for the outcome of the Orange 
Revolution, they agree that the popular protests were “the birth” of a civil society that has now 
undergone an elementary stage in its development, but is still nascent in nature (McFaul 2005; 
Kudelia 2007; Gelman 2008). Ukraine’s civil society is, therefore, a weak bottom-up force.   
Hence, the elite are the only domestic forces capable of building institutions in Ukraine. 
Among the various elite groups, the oligarchic clans are the most powerful bottom-up forces, 
“capturing” the state authorities and controlling the enforcement and implementation of 
institutional reforms (Hellman 1998; Zimmer 2006; Pleines 2005, 2008). During the early 
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stages of transition, the oligarchic clans were responsible for the gridlock in institutional 
convergence with the EU. By 2004, they had changed their political and economic preferences, 
supported the Orange Revolution and the following bottom-up institutional convergence and 
managed to maintain their immense influence in Ukraine’s politics and in its economy.6 Thus, 
we concentrate exclusively on oligarchic clans as the most powerful bottom-up force of 
institutional change in Ukraine. 
The oligarchic clans are a special hybrid of the political and business elite, which is a 
major actor in both Ukraine’s politics and its economy. They are not groups of relatives or 
systems of kinship, as are the classic European and Asian clans, but rather business entities.7 
Thus, they are mainly interested in accumulating wealth and capturing new markets. However, 
the oligarchic clans also are different from a classic business entity in the way they use the 
strategy “power-money-power” for wealth accumulation. Namely, access to state power 
enables the oligarchic clans to secure their economic interests and make profits, which they use 
to broaden their political power. A symbiosis of politics and business does not involve just a 
simple patronage connection. Besides lobbying, networking and bribing to influence politics, 
the oligarchic clans aim at assimilating the political elite. The assimilation of clan’s members 
in politics and vice versa is a common phenomenon in Ukraine.  
The Ukrainian clans exhibit hierarchical levels. The top position is held by a chieftain 
who is surrounded by a core, i.e. the most trustworthy group of business partners, relatives and 
friends. The chieftain and members of a core are often called oligarchs. Lower positions in a 
clan’s hierarchy are held by professionals and ordinary employees who work in the enterprises 
under the clan’s control. Agents of influence or patrons in politics hold a special position. 
Officially, they are not members of a particular clan, but their mutual support and cooperation 
are vital for the clan’s fortune.8 State officials supply the clans with valuable information about 
state policy plans and ensure them a privileged economic position and profits by providing 
licenses, tax exemptions and subsidies. 
In the political framework of Ukraine’s “defective democracy”9 (Merkel et al. 2003), 
oligarchic clans capture the state and directly access political power through the executive, the 
legislative or judicial branches.10 Yet, the value of having access to a particular state branch 
varies over time. In the early 1990s, a direct connection to the president was of the highest 
value.11 Thus, the Ukrainian clans concentrated their attention on building up their connections 
in the executive. They secured their enterprises through contacts to the president, the 
presidential administration and the government in general. In the late 1990s, connections to 
parliamentary representatives or - even better – obtaining a personal mandate increasingly 
gained more importance. Some oligarchs founded or captured political parties, or simply 
bought slots on party lists. Others used one-man constituencies in Ukraine’s mixed majoritarian 
and proportional representation system to become members of the Verkhovna Rada (the 
Ukrainian parliament). The oligarchs became independent from national politics and 
transformed themselves into state actors that translated their interests into public policy, 
passing “made-for-oligarch” laws.12 Such laws ensured, for instance, preferable trade 
conditions or tax relief for specific economic sectors, regions or enterprises. In addition, the 
oligarchs received full personal immunity for their term of office, which helped them to avoid 
criminal responsibility. They could thus use their privileges secure their illegal wealth and 
avoid persecution or punishment by the tax administration. As a result, oligarchic clans have 
been able to expand their influence disproportionally and accumulate a great amount of wealth. 
During the privatization of state enterprises, the oligarchic clans exploited their 
connections in politics to acquire those state enterprises that promised the large profits. 
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Representatives of a particular oligarchic clan in politics provided reliable information on the 
financial situation and production capacities of the state enterprises to be privatized, ensured 
their clan a privileged position, and the possibility to buy the state enterprises at low prices 
during the privatization auctions. As a result, oligarchic wealth became concentrated in the 
most profitable sectors of Ukraine’s economy, such as gas and oil, metal, food-proceeding, and 
machinery sectors.  
Because oligarchic capital is spread across various sectors, it was difficult to say which 
clan dominated which sector. The only exceptions were with the agrarian and coal mining 
clans, who were interested in sectoral benefits (Kubicek 2000; Pleines 2005, 2008).13 In the 
early years of transition, clans mostly covered a region, but, with greater diversification and an 
increasing number of clans, their regional dominance also became less clear-cut (Wittkowsky 
2001; Kowall and Zimmer 2002; Zimmer 2006). Often, clans coming from the same region 
rivaled each other in doing business or influencing politics.14 Hence, a particular oligarchic 
clan did not push for sectoral or regional preferences, but rather for preferences for particular 
enterprises in which the clan was involved. The particularly low level of trust between the 
oligarchic clans in Ukraine accelerated rivalry and made their collective actions difficult 
(Aslund 2005). As they often conducted their day-to-day business in the same economic sectors 
and in the same regions, the Ukrainian oligarchic clans were often rivals. 
The rivalry between the oligarchic clans was reflected in the political regime of Ukraine, 
which suffered from the syndrome of “feckless pluralism” (Carothers 2002). The clans used 
their political connections to the state branches instrumentally and transmitted their conflicts 
into politics, thereby making the political system highly competitive, its institutions inefficient, 
and the political regime largely unstable. Ukraine’s state authorities represented the preferences 
of the rival oligarchic clans and conflicted with each other, passing contradictory and opaque 
laws. Moreover, president Leonid Kuchma’s “divide and rule” strategy even strengthened the 
syndrome of “feckless pluralism”. He appointed representatives of rival oligarchic clans to 
offices with similar levels of power,15 in order to prevent the rise of possible internal rivals and 
even reinforced the rivalry among the clans.  
By the end of Kuchma’s second and last constitutionally possible term in office, it looked 
like the Ukrainian clans had reached the equilibrium of institutional development and power 
distribution. A particular clan was either satisfied with or did not have sufficient power to 
change the status quo of Ukraine’s “defective democracy” with its partial reforms, in which 
some democratic and market economy principles, e.g. elections and private property, were 
implemented, but the rule of law and large-scale macroeconomic reforms failed (Hellmann 
1998). This status quo was advantageous to accumulate wealth. However, it was 
disadvantageous to ensure property rights and the security of the accumulated wealth. Due to 
the large number of oligarchic clans, Kuchma’s “divide and rule” strategy also led to the 
regular rotation of persons and also meant high instability and insecurity for those who had 
already accumulated a great amount of wealth. Such a strategy also gave fewer incentives for 
the oligarchic clans to invest in and to modernize their enterprises. New persons in office could 
withdraw their beneficial budget compensations and privileges in Ukraine’s markets. 
Furthermore, with a new person in office, previous office holders and their oligarchic clan with 
illegally accumulated wealth ran the danger of being prosecuted by the state.  
The president was the most powerful force in Ukraine’s political system. Thus, the 
presidential election of 2004 was especially important for the security of illegally accumulated 
wealth. By becoming the president, a representative of a particular clan could destroy the 
financial imperia of the other clans. As a result, in the “defective democracy”, the presidential 
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election became an Achilles’ heel for the oligarchic clans (Hale 2005). Due to the lack of 
transparency in and the frequent abuse of institutional mechanisms of election and consequent 
power transfer, any clan powerful enough to manipulate election outcomes was able to push its 
representative for the presidency. The uncertainty among the oligarchic clans about the fate of 
their wealth, if a representative of a rival clan were to win the presidential elections, was high. 
The designated successor of Kuchma, Viktor Yanukovych, had to admit his inability to unite 
all the clans behind his candidature. Part of the reason for this was his support for one 
particular clan (of the Doneck region) during his years as the prime minister before the election 
in 2004. It was not credible that he could become a dominating arbiter, who could act in the 
interest of all the clans. Despite the rivalry in their day-to-day business, the oligarchic clans 
joined forces to secure their wealth in the run-up to the presidential elections in 2004. Because 
Ukraine’s “defective” democracy did not provide an institutional framework for actors to settle 
disputes and realize the potential gains, the various oligarchic clans built a coalition to confront 
with the incumbent president and his designated successor (North 1990). 
Hence, most oligarchs directly or indirectly supported the Orange Revolution of 2004 and 
the subsequent institution building in the political and economic system of Ukraine 
(Malynkovych 2006, Melnykovska 2008). They participated in the Orange Revolution 
personally or provided media space for the “orange” candidate for the presidency, Viktor 
Yushchenko, and for his proponents, to report about election fraud and to organize the mass 
demonstrations (Mr. Yushchenko’s opponent was Yanukovych, the “white-and-blue” 
candidate).16 The uncertainty about their wealth security united all the clans under the common 
goal of overthrowing the presidential regime and pushing for some minimal convergence 
towards European standards. They eliminated the possibility that anyone oligarchic clan could 
monopolize state authorities and they supported the new institutional framework of the political 
system to ensure that a “pluralism” of the clans’ influence in the politics was established.  
Given the very low trust between the Ukrainian clans, transforming Ukraine from a 
presidential into a parliamentary republic, where no force was able to monopolize state power, 
was the second best choice for all oligarchic clans. During round table negotiations in 
November-December 2004, “orange” and “white-and-blue” leaders agreed on a package of 
laws, known as the “package deal”. With the support of the Ukrainian oligarchic clans, this 
package was approved by the Verkhovna Rada by an overwhelming vote of 402 to 21. It 
changed the division of powers between the president and the parliament that was specified in 
the constitution of 1996 and amended electoral law. The constitutional change transformed the 
Ukrainian political system of a presidential republic by adopting a number of features 
necessary to establish parliamentarianism. It reduced the presidential powers and strengthened 
the powers of the parliament. The amendment of the electoral law guaranteed fair competition 
in the run-off of the presidential election that had to be repeated in December 2004. To calm 
mass demonstrations against election fraud, and taking reference to the newly amended 
electoral law, the central electoral commission was reshuffled and the possibilities for fraud 
stemming from home voting and absentee ballots were substantially reduced. The candidate of 
the “orange” forces, Yushchenko, obtained the chance to win the repeated run-off of the 
presidential election, but this time under fair competition. In return, the “orange” forces agreed 
that the newly elected president would lose some of his powers in favor of the parliament. As a 
result, Yushchenko won the election and became the president. Because the constitutional 
change was not to enter into force until after the parliamentary election in 2006, he still enjoyed 
the framework of the presidential republic and appointed the first “orange” government 
(January-September 2005), headed by his ally Yulia Tymoshenko. However, a new equilibrium 
of power distribution among the elite was not established. 
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In the following months after the Orange Revolution, the parliamentary elections 
intensified the rivalry either between the politicians or between the clans and made establishing 
a new equilibrium difficult. In the struggle for votes and seats in the future parliament, the 
members of the “orange” coalition started to blame each other for the failures of the first 
“orange” government.17 The coalition fell apart, soon opening the door for a comeback of the 
“white-and-blue” forces. As a result of the parliamentary election in 2006, the “white-and-
blue” coalition led by the Party of Regions came back to political power. Supported by the 
Communist and the Socialist Parties, Viktor Yanukovych became prime minister again. The 
struggle for political dominance and control over state authorities between the “orange” 
presidency and the “white-and-blue” government and the legislative led to a deadlock in state 
governance. As a consequence, the Ukrainian parliament was dissolved in September 2007 and 
Ukraine held pre-term parliamentary elections. This time, the parliamentary elections resulted 
in the resurrection of the “orange” coalition, headed again by Tymoshenko as prime minister. 
However, recent political disputes about privatization, dismissal and appointment of heads of 
regional, district, and local administrations, as well as control over the State Property Fund and 
authorities of the National Security and Defense Council (Boltushkina et al. 2008) have raised 
doubts about the sustainability of this second “orange” coalition. 
Since 2006, the position of the parliament has strengthened and the number of powerful 
veto-players in Ukraine’s politics has consequently increased. The president can no longer 
dominate politics. In contrast, the elite (also the oligarchic clans), which are present in the 
parliament, have gained more influence, but need to negotiate any political decision with each 
other or with the president. The oligarchic clans, whose prosperity depends on having a stake 
of their parties in the government, have become involved in the political struggles. The 
oligarchic clans have got their representatives into the new parliament (which is more 
influential than the old parliament) using the party lists. The day-to-day preferences of rival 
business clans have prevailed over striving for political stability. After the Orange Revolution, 
the “feckless pluralism” of the political system has become even more pronounced and, until 
now, prevented the establishment of a new equilibrium of power distribution. 
However, the oligarchic clans may become the bottom-up force to consolidate the state 
power. Basically, the political elite could not replace the oligarchic clans as a driver of 
institutional reforms. The clans are present in all the major political parties and control the 
executive and judicial branches. Moreover, they depend less on short-term electoral periods 
and public opinion than the political elite. Thus, the oligarchic clans can pursue a goal of 
institutional convergence with the EU which promises them long-term benefits of sustainable 
growth, even if the achievement of this goal causes social costs in a short-term perspective. 
However, unlike in Russia, the oligarchic clans find it difficult to conduct the “collective 
actions”. “Collective actions” are difficult, because of their great number, sectoral and regional 
diversification and the low level of trust between clans, but they are not impossible 
(Melnykovska 2008). Attaining minimum institutional standards for their business has been an 
incentive strong enough to make them join forces to push for institutional convergence, as was 
exemplified by their successful negotiations with the WTO completed in 2008. Despite the 
political crises, the “while-and-blue” and “orange” forces in the parliament passed the laws 
necessary to complete the negotiations on WTO accession and the “orange” president did not 
use his veto. Depending on the preferences of the Ukrainian oligarchic clans, the EU may 
provide them well-targeted incentives other than a membership perspective to accelerate a 
bottom-up institutional building. Therefore, the political and economic preferences of 
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Ukraine’s oligarchic clans, as well as the determinants that create and change these 
preferences, are need to be identified. 
 
3. Transforming Oligarchic Clans into Global Players 
 
Two theoretical approaches to institutional change explain why oligarchic clans 
supported by external incentives could change their political and economic preferences and 
become the driving forces of a bottom-up institutional convergence in CIS countries. A 
prominent theory on internal drivers of institutional change and the evolution of rent-seeking 
societies is Olson’s theory (2000) of the evolution of state rulers and the exploitation of rents, 
which either hinders or supports institution building.18 Olson distinguishes between “roving” 
and “stationary bandits”. Translated into a CIS framework, “roving” oligarchic clans 
concentrate on exploiting short-term rents like those stemming from non-renewable resources. 
After getting sufficiently rich and reaching the limits of wealth accumulation and control, 
“roving” clans transform into “stationary” clans and begin to care about securing their wealth. 
While “roving” clans can rely on informal institutions, “stationary” clans need and demand 
formal institutions, which implies that they begin to support institutional development. In terms 
of Olson’s theory it is important that clans become stationary in order to change their 
preferences and demand better (formal) institutions. 
While this process may be rather slow, or even painfully slow in resource dependent 
economies, according to the other theory of institutional change in rent-seeking societies, 
opening up a country to globalization,19 i.e. to trade and investment flows, may work as a 
catalyst for transforming the preferences of oligarchic clans (Havrylyshyn 2006a). With 
hindsight, the popular debate about an appropriate sequencing of opening up and institution 
building seems to be misleading. In the early 1990s, institutional reforms were a by-product of 
other high priority policies on macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization and enterprise 
restructuring (Hare 2001). Follow-up institutional reforms either did not take place or lacked 
implementation effort. Arguably, structural policies like opening up a country to the world 
market and institution building at home have to reinforce each other in order to be successful.  
As argued by Havrylyshyn (2006a), the majority of CIS countries, which have been 
closed economies, reformed and changed their institutions moderately. They have also 
experienced the greatest social pain. Vested interests in these countries have been working 
towards the creation of “capitalism for the few” and concentrating ownership in the hands of 
the selected elite. He calls such states the “oligarchic societies”. By comparison, the CEECs 
countries have been more successful at reforming their institutions because they have been 
more open. The results of Havrylyshyn’s research suggest that openness ensures economic 
recovery and democratic institutions. Thus, the establishment of an open market economy and 
institution building complement rather than exclude each other. Replying to debates between 
“shock therapy” supporters and gradualists, Havrylyshyn comes to the conclusion that a more 
useful view of sequencing should begin with a basic and simplified legal-regulatory 
institutional framework that is comprehensive but not deep, thereby opening up a country, and 
should then follow-up with refinements of these institutions over time (Havrylyshyn 2006b). 
This is exactly why oligarchic interests matter in the context of institution building in 
transition countries like Ukraine. Opening up a country can work as a catalyst for otherwise 
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rather slow processes of changing the political and economic preferences of the oligarchic 
clans, assuming that they have an interest in reaping the potential benefits from trade and 
foreign investment. Clearly, the success of institution building depends on the interests of the 
powerful elite in the first place (Keohane 1984). Therefore, the political and economic costs 
and benefits to these elite are key to explaining the nature and scope of change (Feeny 
1988:168). Opening up may well change the cost-benefit calculation of “roving” clans. While 
the impact of legacies (resource endowment, access to power) is constant, openness is a 
conditional variable which ensures that “changes in relative prices – and therefore changes in 
the cost-benefit calculations – are the most important source of institutional change” driven by 
the bottom-up domestic elite (North 1990:84). It can be shown for the case of Ukraine that the 
oligarchic clans actually have this kind of incentives to change their preferences and to demand 
better institutions and institutional convergence towards European standards.20  
Combining the theories on rent-seeking limits and openness, rent-seekers should be 
subject to limits when seeking to accumulate wealth with informal institutions in a closed 
economy and should transform from domestic into global players that demand formal 
institutions in order to reap the benefits of interacting with global markets. Changes in sources 
of rents can result in such limits to rent-seeking. It is evident from Table 1 that the sources of 
rents have changed over time and thereby increased competitive pressures for Ukraine’s 
oligarchic clans. In the early 1990s, fuel and metal product exports were the most attractive 
sources of rents. In addition, large-scale credits from government in combination with 
hyperinflation resulted in huge subsidies for the clans (Prizel 2002). Finally, the oligarchic 
clans benefited from exporting highly subsidized gas and oil imports from Russia. In the Soviet 
era, Russia subsidized Ukraine by supplying around 50 million tons of oil and substantial 
amounts of gas each year at prices at roughly 35-40% of world market prices. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and other energy-rich CIS countries did not intend to 
continue subsidization of the Ukrainian oligarchic clans. The prices for imported energy to 
Ukraine increased continuously, but were still under world price level.21 
In the mid-1990s, rents stemming from hyperinflation disappeared, but the clans 
continued to benefit from the political patronage that supplied them with indirect subsidies, 
special treatment and tax incentives (Van Zon 2000). Until the financial crisis in 1998, the 
international community was more concerned with the political stability of Ukraine, because it 
possessed nuclear weapons, than with its progress on institutional reform. Hence, during the 
initial transition years, the preferences of the oligarchic clans where dominated by domestic 
developments. 
Following the financial crisis, the most important source of economic rents in Ukraine 
still stemmed from imports of gas and oil from Russia and other energy-rich CIS countries.22 
However, the limits of such economic rents became more and more evident. Finally, the 
termination of possibilities to reap economic rents was marked by the latest developments in 
the gas market. According to the agreements signed in the spring of 2004, Ukraine covered its 
energy debts to Gazprom with Eurobonds and transit charges for Russian gas up to 2009. For 
the Ukrainian oligarchic companies, it meant no gas for transit from 2005 on. At the same time, 
Gazprom revealed its intent to raise the gas prices to the world levels (Stern 2006). After the 
2006 crisis, Gazprom sold gas to Ukraine via the joint company RosUkrEnergo at a price of 
$230/mcm (Gazprom Press Release 2006).23 
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Table 1. The sources of oligarchic rents in Ukraine 
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 Source: Aslund (2005); Prizel (2002); Zimmer (2006); own illustration. 
 
 
 
Generally, even before the Orange Revolution, the possibilities for oligarchic clans to 
profit from cheap Russian energy imports had almost disappeared. In addition, the 
requirements of good corporate governance and transparency became essential for Ukraine’s 
oligarchic groups to do business in international markets. Indeed, Table 2 shows that oligarchic 
clans in Ukraine have increased their wealth considerably and become more transparent during 
recent years. Due to rapid economic growth since the end of 1990s, most oligarchs at least 
doubled their wealth. The Wprost rating of the 100 richest Europeans for 2007 includes 24 
Ukrainians, with fortunes as large as $18,700 million. For comparison, in 2002 only 3 
Ukrainians were listed among the richest Europeans, with fortunes as large as $1,700 million. 
These numbers show not only a rising accumulation of wealth due to increased business 
activities, but also show that there were transfers of wealth from the shadow into the official 
economy. By 2007, several of the major oligarchs had become fully legal and legitimate, were 
paying taxes, had declared their ownership and were spending substantial amounts for charity. 
The case studies on the Ukrainian energy, metal and chemical sectors confirm the ongoing 
implementation of corporate governance norms. In these sectors, the business and ownership 
structure became more transparent, international bookkeeping norms were launched, and 
companies and corporations began to develop long-term strategies (Heinrich 2004; Zheka 
2006; Pleines 2008). Making one’s business transparent under informal institutions is highly 
risky and therefore makes better formal institutions necessary. Transparency and good 
corporate governance also meant that illegal “shadow” resources used to ensure wealth and 
market benefits by means of state capture or corruption were scaled back. 
Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert: Who you gonna call? – Oligarchic Clans as a 
Bottom-up Force of Neighborhood Europeanization in Ukraine 
  16 
 
 
Table 2. The wealth of Ukrainian oligarchs, 2002-2007 
 
 Wprost Ukraine 
Year Total number Total number max Wealth, in million $US 
2002 25 3 1 700 
2003 50 6 1 900 
2004 50 5 3 500 
2005 100 7 2 800 
2006 100 15 7 200 
2007 100 24 18 700 
 
Source: Lista 100 Najbogatszych Europy, Wprost; own calculations. 
 
Obtaining investment for modernization has also become a big challenge for Ukraine. 
Current growth has an extensive character, based on the old capital stock with exports of 
intermediary, semi-finished and low-quality goods. The efficiency of the basic exporting 
sectors – e.g. the metal sector – is low, while the energy wastage is high. At the same time, 
Ukraine’s exporting sectors are aging.24 Thus, the modernization – i.e. replacement of the old 
capital stock and increase of their efficiency – that is needed to make economic growth 
sustainable has become the priority of the Ukrainian oligarchic clans whose assets are 
concentrated mostly in the exporting sectors. In addition, the clans have improved their access 
to international capital markets and increased the capitalization and diversification of their 
assets, which has led to more financial openness, the disappearance of transfer pricing, the 
transparency of taxable profits and demand for better institutions. 
Overall, after the financial crisis in 1998, the sources of economic rents for the Ukrainian 
clans have either disappeared or became more limited. The oligarchic clans, whose business 
became more and more internationalized, were forced to implement international standards of 
transparency and corporate governance. In addition, to be competitive in international markets, 
they needed and still need to modernize their energy-intensive companies, especially in the 
energy, metal, and chemical sectors. The modernization, however, requires large financial 
investment, which in turn depends on political stability and quality of institutions. Hence, 
increasing trade and investment relations can be treated as an exogenous force, limiting the 
sources of rents and challenging oligarchic clans in Ukraine to improve institutions and 
converge with the EU standards. 
Initially, the political system in Ukraine did not react to the changing political and 
economic preferences of the oligarchic clans. As can be seen in Figure 1, there was no clear 
trend in institution building after the 1998 crisis. Only after the Orange Revolution the impact 
of institutional reforms leads to the progress in building institutions as measured by the World 
Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) (Figure 1). Quite unusually, the progress in building 
economic-administrative and legal institutions is even stronger than the progress in building 
political institutions. The usual pattern of institution building in CIS countries is rather that 
follow-up economic-administrative and legal reforms are more difficult to implement than 
political reforms (Hammermann et al. 2005). Given the political turmoil following the Orange 
Revolution, it is far from clear whether or not this progress in building institutions implying an 
increased convergence of Ukraine towards European institutional standards can be sustained. 
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Figure 1 shows a slight slow-down in the development of economic –administrative and legal 
institutions in 2006-2007, but strong improvement in building political institutions. Further 
steps towards the integration of Ukraine into the EU would be clearly in the interest of Ukraine 
oligarchic clans because this would imply that trade and investment relations could be 
expanded.  
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Figure 1. Progress in institution building in Ukraine, 1996-2004  
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators; own calculations. 
 
4. Ukrainian Business Interests and EU Leverage for Better 
Institutions 
 
Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) figures reveal that Ukraine’s regional and 
global integration is on the rise. Its level of trade openness has increased considerably. Imports 
and exports are equivalent to 90% of GDP and are now comparable to other countries in the 
region. As has been argued above, Ukrainian oligarchic clans have become increasingly export-
oriented and have profited from external trade, but they urgently need new technologies and 
investment to become more competitive on EU and global markets.  
The importance of the EU as Ukraine’s main trading partner and investor is increasing. 
The EU has even become more important than CIS countries, although energy imports from the 
latter region still figure prominently (Figure 2). In 2006, EU-Ukraine trade surpassed €27 
billion due to a strong increase in imports, but was on a steady rise even before (Table 3). 
Despite this significant reorientation of exports toward the EU, the extent of Ukraine’s trade 
with the EU is still lagging behind that of new EU members. To some extent, Ukraine’s trade 
pattern reflects the trade policies of the past and Ukraine’s difficulty in deciding on priorities 
for international integration. Being sandwiched between Russia and the EU, Ukraine has tried 
to integrate in both directions (Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006). As a consequence, Ukraine 
depends on Russian fuels and EU machinery and equipment. Its dependency on Russian fuels 
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is a carryover/legacy from the Soviet era, which left it with an extremely inefficient energy 
sector. It is now not only a net importer of gas and oil, but is also the economy in the region 
that consumes the most energy. Prices for the Russian gas and oil have increased, leading to the 
introduction of energy-saving technologies and the diversification of energy suppliers and the 
types of energy used. Thus, it is to be expected Ukraine will reduce its dependence upon 
Russia. 
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Figure 2. Ukraine’s trade with EU and CIS, 2001-2005 ($ million) 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
Table 3. Ukraine’s trade with the EU 2002-2006  
Year 
Imports, 
€ million 
Yearly % 
change 
EU 
Share of 
total 
imports 
Exports, 
€ million 
Yearly % 
change 
EU 
Share of 
total 
exports 
Balance, 
€ million 
Imports+ 
Exports, 
€ million 
2002 5.729  31,97 6.105  32,60 376 11.835 
2003 6.859 19,7 32,27 6.972 14,2 32,70 112 13.831 
2004 7.536 9,9 32,40 7.876 13,0 30,22 340 15.412 
2005 9.543 26,6 32,93 7.400 -6,0 27,21 -2.143 16.943 
2006 19.605 105,4 42,65 8.007 8,2 25,57 -11.597 27.612 
Average 
annual 
growth, 
% 
 36,0 
 
 7,0 
 
 23,6 
Source: EU EUROSTAT, External Trade Statistics. 
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Up to now, however, the structure of Ukraine’s trade with the EU and Russia still 
reveal the traditional pattern, with the westward movement of raw materials and semi-
processed goods, and the eastward (opposite) movement of final products, primarily 
investment goods. Looking at trade with the EU, Figure 3 reveals that, although total trade 
figures increased especially for EU trade, the structure of Ukraine exports and imports 
remained rather stable. Iron and steel clearly dominate Ukrainian exports. In 2005, they had a 
share of 24% in Ukraine’s total exports to the EU-27. Other exports to the EU mainly consisted 
of primary products which made up for about 35% of total exports. This picture clearly reveals 
the high dependence of Ukraine exports on a few commodities and products. So far, the 
international business cycle and China’s new role in the world market have provided favorable 
conditions for Ukraine’s exports and its economic recovery. At the same time, Ukraine exports 
are highly dependent on these developments and diversification is needed in order to provide a 
broader basis for export expansion (World Bank 2004). Thus, diversification is of high priority 
for Ukraine’s oligarchic clans, who are trying to secure and expand their position in the 
society.  
 
Figure 3. Ukraine‘s trade with the EU by product, 2006 (€ million) 
Source: EU EUROSTAT, External Trade Statistics.  
 
Besides being an important trade partner, the EU is also an important investor in 
Ukraine’s economy. Although Ukraine initially failed to attract a significant amount of capital 
from abroad and from the EU in particular, FDI inflows to Ukraine increased considerably 
from $3,8 billion in 2004 to almost $16 billion in 2007. Considering the origin of foreign 
investors present in Ukraine, the EU is by far the largest investor. The share of EU FDI in total 
FDI jumped from 56% in 2004 to 75% in 2007.25 It is followed by the United States, a set of 
so-called “offshore zones” and CIS countries, mainly Russia.  
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However, capital coming to Ukraine from the west and from the east differs not only by 
volumes, but also by investment motives and distribution of funds across economic sectors. 
Recipients of investment from Europe are mostly companies operating in the food, chemical 
and machine building sectors (Emerson et al. 2006). The wholesale and retail trade sectors have 
also received a significant amount of investment from the EU. At the same time, Russian 
investment is concentrated in the fuel and energy sector. Russian oil companies have acquired 
almost all Ukrainian oil-refineries, which in Soviet Union times were constructed specifically 
for processing Russian oil. Another object of interest for investors from the “northern 
neighbour” was healthcare complexes in the region of Crimea.  
More generally, however, FDI in Ukraine seems to follow Ukraine’s trade patterns and 
reflect its production links. While stronger production links between Ukrainian and Russian 
enterprises in certain sectors would be beneficial for both countries, capital from the more 
advanced economies of the EU could bring benefits – such as generating new production, 
management, and marketing technologies, better labor skills, improvement in risk management 
– that are more relevant for the long-run growth and development of the Ukrainian economy. 
Another important benefit is that western companies also tend to “export” to Ukraine European 
institutional standards.  
In its turn, institutional development, especially the absence of corruption and 
improvement in the business environment, attracts FDI. According to survey results, the main 
motive for western companies operating in Ukraine was the possibility to access a large 
domestic market (International Centre for Policy Studies 2000). Indeed, with its 48 million 
inhabitants, Ukraine represents one of the biggest national markets in Europe, which, in 
addition, has a good potential for growth in terms of purchasing power. Relatively low labor 
costs are also reported as one of the motives for investment; however, this advantage is dimin-
ished by low productivity. At the same time, the poor quality of the business environment and 
institutions is often quoted as a reason why Ukraine has attracted only small amounts of FDI, 
though it has considerable comparative advantages over CEECs (Mayhew 2006). 
While Ukraine’s problems are home-made to a large extent, the Ukrainian business 
interests of the oligarchic clans also have to overcome substantial obstacles when trying to 
enter foreign markets which are closely related to institutional convergence. At the same time, 
the incentives provided by market access have already helped institutional convergence. Again, 
this is an example of how the interests of the clans have been united and succeeded in pushing 
reforms in a considerably short time. The Ukrainian oligarchic clans strived for better access to 
the European Market as long as their commodities were hampered by the antidumping 
measures that the EU applies to third countries. On the European steel market, Ukrainian 
oligarchic clans exporting metal products competed against Russian and Rumanian steel 
producers which benefited from the status of a full-fledged market of their economies and, at 
the same time, provided the yardstick for evaluating Ukrainian exports. Furthermore, Ukrainian 
metal sector has attracted less foreign direct investment (FDI) than the Russian metal sector, as 
Ukraine’s metal exports have permanently been under EU antidumping investigations and 
subject to EU antidumping penalties (Eremenko and Lisenkova 2004).26 The penalties for 
Ukraine’s metal exports ranged from 24% to 64%, raised the price and reduced the 
competitiveness of the Ukrainian goods. These penalties depend on whether, according to EU 
calculations, a particular export product is sold at dumping prices. While calculating dumping 
prices, the EU takes into account the economic status that the EU grants a country of origin. 
Exports from a country without the status of a full-fledged market economy are more 
vulnerable to antidumping penalties, than a country enjoying this status.27 Thus, institutional 
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building is very important, as the EU uses the level of institutional quality in a particular 
country as the main criteria to grant the status of a full-fledged market economy to a particular 
country. Thus, to escape high antidumping penalties, the Ukrainian oligarchic clans have 
strived for this status for their individual enterprises as well as for Ukraine’s economy in 
general and have pushed for the improvement of Ukraine’s poor institutional quality.  
The negotiations with the EU about obtaining the status of a full-fledged market economy 
started in 2000. However, the European Union Council of Ministers initially granted Ukraine 
only the status of a transitional quasi-market economy, but did offer the status of a full-fledged 
market economy to certain Ukrainian companies. By 2005, two Ukrainian companies - Azot 
and Gorlovka Stirol - obtained this status. However, given the lack of institutional reforms that 
could provide safeguards by implementing formal rules, the political risks of expropriation for 
Ukrainian producers when making their business more transparent were very high. Therefore, 
the Ukrainian oligarchic clans used their political influence to implement the institutional 
reforms required for achieving the status of a full-fledged market economy for the whole 
country and to accelerate negotiations with the EU (Honcharuk 2006). Finally, in the aftermath 
of the Orange Revolution (in 2005) and due to the progress in building institutions, Ukraine 
obtained the status of a full-fledged market economy. 
Generally, Ukraine when trying to penetrate foreign markets and to attract foreign 
investment faces by far more problems at home than abroad. The greatest internal barriers to 
international trade in the country, as perceived by traders, are the following: the general 
complexity of regulations and their unfair enforcement, including a multitude o f pre-customs 
permits, registrations, licenses, technical regulations, and, related to this, corruption, delays, 
and high compliance costs, the slow and costly process of VAT reimbursements to exporters, 
which continues to receive highly negative grades in business surveys, and the unpredictability 
of and corruption in customs (World Bank 2004). Hence, some of the main limitations to 
expanding trade and investment relations are domestic and relate to institutional development. 
Convergence with the EU (import of EU company legislation, EU rules on standardization and 
certification, EU competition rules, EU customs procedures, etc.) would not only help 
eliminate these internal barriers but would also strongly support Ukraine’s integration with the 
EU (Vinhas de Souza et al. 2006). 
WTO membership is an imperfect substitute for EU integration as regards finding who 
might support Ukraine in becoming a competitive market economy with democratic 
structures.28 An assumption present in some studies is that the process of obtaining WTO 
membership – Ukraine announced its intention to join the WTO as early as 1993 – can be a 
stepping-stone for EU membership given that some of the requirements are similar for both 
processes (Blue Ribbon Commission for Ukraine 2004; World Bank 2004) and that WTO 
membership should, therefore, precede EU membership. Although it is true in the sense that no 
country has ever entered the EU without having first entered the WTO, the connection between 
these two “options” is not very strong. As the experience of the last enlargement round shows, 
most of the applications for EU membership preceded WTO membership, and frequently by 
several years.29 The Baltic countries, whose economic problems most resemble the sort of 
problems faced by Ukraine, did join the WTO until as late as 1999. For most of the former EU 
candidate countries, the causality was actually the reverse: the fulfillment of WTO membership 
conditions came about as a by-product of the EU Accession process. Additionally, the 
assumption that the WTO is an effective framework provider that will enhance domestic 
reforms – especially on the scale necessary for EU Accession – seems to overestimate the 
“minimum common denominator” negotiation process that actually leads to WTO membership 
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(which, among other things, is responsible for the usually disappointing trade increases a 
country experiences after joining the WTO).30 
EU accession and, to a lesser extent, cooperation would clearly be a great deal more 
effective to Ukraine in exporting a much more robust and comprehensive regulatory framework 
than WTO membership. If one assumes EU accession is the main objective, the EU integration 
process includes all the necessary reforms for WTO entry. This is especially true within the 
framework of pre-accession free trade agreements, as was the case in the last round of 
enlargement. For Ukraine, which is far from EU accession and free deep trade agreements with 
the EU, it implies that membership in the WTO may provide some intermediate target with, 
however, limited additional impact on the willingness of Ukrainian oligarchic clans to support 
further institutional convergence.  
Accordingly, the second government of Tymoshenko (since December 2007) made 
Europeanization an explicit goal of domestic reforms rather than treating it as a foreign policy 
goal. Tymoshenko declared that Europeanization is one of her government’s priorities. The 
negotiations on a free trade area, simplification of the visa requirements, participation in EU 
programs and agencies and development of energy cooperation are the main tasks on her 
government’s agenda. Furthermore, Tymoshenko has supported her political declaration by 
implementing wide-ranging reform programs. Launching the government program “Ukrainian 
breakthrough: not for politicians, but for the people”, Tymoshenko stressed that her 
Transparency Initiative is based on understanding of the necessity for changes and reforms in 
Ukraine that are in accordance with key European values and the demands of Ukrainian civil 
society.31  
However, the political declarations are difficult to implement without bottom-up support. 
According to Razumkov Zentrum (Razumkov Center 2008), 224 of 227 governments’ reforms 
(both of Yanukovych and of Tymoshenko) were in line with the AP priorities for 2007.32 Only 
one third of the government reforms, however, were fully implemented. Almost 40% of the 
implemented reforms dealt with AP priorities regarding economic and regulatory policy, trade 
and the new perspective of economic cooperation with the EU. The political crises were the 
main obstacle to better implementation. Similarly, the effectiveness of current government 
activities is rather low due to the ongoing struggles for power between the government, the 
parliament, the president, and the oligarchic clans (Boltushkina et al. 2008).  
However, there is no deep commitment on the part of the EU for any deep free trade 
agreement (FTA+). Already the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the bilateral 
agreement which governed EU-Ukraine relations until 2008, was more a declaration of 
intentions to cooperate in different areas (political cultural, scientific cooperation, trade, 
investment, etc.) than anything else. It does not offer any specified mechanisms or benefits for 
achieving cooperation. The new ENP framework is not very different (Afanasyeva et al. 2008). 
There is still no specified mechanisms that provides a roadmap as well as benefits, and, in 
addition, it is based on the intention of the EU to prolong top-down “Enlargement 
Europeanization” as “Neighborhood Europeanization”, i.e. it details what the EU wants without 
offering a reasonable “carrot” as an incentive for domestic forces like the oligarchic clans to 
support necessary reforms.  
Ukraine entered the ENP framework in 2004. The first EU-Ukraine AP was drafted in 
late 2004 ̶ before the Orange Revolution ̶ and was signed with slight changes in February 2005 
after the new Ukrainian government protested about some of its draft’s provisions. It defined 
the priorities of cooperation in different policy areas and the mechanism of their 
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implementation for three years. Further, it targeted the following: promotion of Ukraine’s 
accession to the WTO, removal of non-tariff barriers, improvement of the investment climate 
and tax reform and approximation of legislation to EU standards. In December 2005 and March 
2008, the European Commission evaluated the implementation of the AP positively (Joint 
Report 2005; 2008). Nevertheless, the mode of operation of the AP is not too distinct from the 
former PCA. The institutional framework and tools used in the relationships between Ukraine 
and the EU remain the same.33 
What the EU could do to offer a reasonable incentive for countries that are not on the 
list of potential accession countries is clearly to provide a FTA+, which could be expected to 
boost trade and investment relations through substantial trade liberalization and regulatory 
harmonization (Emerson et al. 2006). In order to achieve this, the FTA+ would have to build 
on the liberalization undertaken as part of WTO membership and work towards “deep 
convergence” – not just cutting tariffs but addressing red tape for exporters by aiming for 
similar regulatory standards and norms in both economies. The significance of such an FTA+ 
would, however, depend on the range of products covered by the agreement. The major 
Ukrainian trade items, such as heavy industry products and agricultural products, belong to the 
“sensitive” sector for the EU and are, therefore, not included in agreements with the EU. 
Furthermore, a large range of Ukrainian products fails to fulfill European standards and is, 
therefore, barred from EU markets by using non-tariff barriers. Nevertheless, a kind of FTA+ 
as a kind of operation scheme with neighboring countries and offering a reasonable incentive 
for cooperation in exchange for the creation of a ring of well-governed countries at the 
periphery of the EU, as is the intention of the EU, should be a realistic target for European 
politics.  
A further step, i.e. offering a stake in the Common Market, would of course be more of 
an incentive for Ukraine’s oligarchic clans to push for further institutional convergence with 
the EU in all the parties but, at the same time, is currently less realistic. It would involve 
participation in the areas of free movement of goods, services, and factors of production. A 
stake in the Common Market has not been offered to non-accession countries but is mentioned 
in the ENP APs for Ukraine and for Moldova.34 While this is clearly expected to have high 
benefits in terms of growth (Brenton and Manchin 2003) and FDI inflows that promote 
technological transfer and efficiency improvements (Levine 1997; Francois and Schuknecht 
1999), the ENP APs are rather wake at this point. Even if it were to become reality, important 
topics for Ukraine, like agriculture and steel markets, could still be excluded from negotiations 
(Milcher and Slay 2005).  
All in all, the stylized facts about trade and FDI as well as the policy discussion should 
have made clear that tying up with the EU is of clear advantage for the oligarchic clans in 
Ukraine. Doing business with the EU could constitute a common denominator that they might 
otherwise lack in order to unite the Ukrainian elite under the goal of improving institutions and 
governance. EU markets, being the largest neighbour markets both in terms of population and 
GDP, are the most attractive market for the Ukrainian oligarchic clans and provide the relevant 
yardstick for meeting high institutional standards. The FTA+ should provide significant 
incentives for re-kindling bottom-up demand for institutional reforms in Ukraine. However, 
given the present design of ENP AP for Ukraine, in which the FTA+ is defined vaguely, one 
can not be overly optimistic. 
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5. Conclusions  
 
The preceding has shown that Ukraine provides a case in point supporting the argument 
that opening it up and integrating it internationally may speed up the change in political and 
economic preferences of the oligarchic clans in favor of formal institutions that otherwise 
might be established only very slowly. In the absence of strong incentives of EU membership 
to initiate top-down institution building, the oligarchic clans that are the most influential part of 
the domestic elite and therefore also the most important bottom-up force to drive the 
institutional convergence of Ukraine towards European standards. The oligarchic clans have 
changed their political and economic preferences from wealth accumulation toward its security 
and a consolidation of their position by means of establishing formal institutional safeguards. 
They needed a minimum of formal institutions in order to meet international standards of doing 
business, and these institutions had not been provided by Kuchma’s regime. Hence, most of the 
oligarchic clans directly or indirectly supported the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the 
consequent institutional change in the political and economic system of Ukraine.  
In the course of the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was transformed into a parliamentary-
presidential republic. Thereby, the probability that any domestic force can monopolize state 
authorities has been diminished, but the number of veto-players in Ukraine’s politics has 
increased. The political crises that have occurred since the end of the Orange Revolutions in 
2005 demonstrate that post-revolutionary institutional reform is a tricky business in Ukraine’s 
political system of “feckless pluralism”. The first Orange coalition, consisting of Our Ukraine 
Party, Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko, and the Socialist Party was dissolved after having lost the sight 
of their common goal of overturning Kuchma’s regime. The Party of Regions won the 
parliamentary election of 2006 and created a wide parliamentary majority with the Communist 
and the Socialist Parties. Having returned to power, the Party of Regions attempted to regain its 
old influence in the new more democratic regime. Obviously, the new democracy passed its 
first test because these attempts failed. However, this led to a political deadlock. The results of 
the recent pre-term parliamentary election of 2007 gave the “orange” forces a new chance to 
promote democratic and market-oriented reforms in Ukraine. However, there seems to be no 
end to Ukraine’s political instability in sight. The second Orange coalition has been short-lived; 
the new parliamentary elections are on horizon. And the situation is worsened by the fact that 
the oligarchic clans, who ensure their wealth through their connections to politics, are also 
involved in the political struggles between the executive and the legislative. 
This implies that there would be an important role to play for the EU as an external driver 
for institution building in Ukraine. Trade and investment flows have increased in recent years, 
providing the EU with the leverage to support bottom-up demand for further reforms in 
Ukraine. With civil society still in its early stage of establishment, such demand has to be based 
on business interests. As shown in the paper, the oligarchic clans found it hard to form a 
coalition for the day-to-day business. An important reason for this is that, contrary to the 
situation in Russia, oligarchic clans are sectoral and regional rivals. Access to EU markets is 
likely to promote further convergence of Ukraine’s legislation with EU standards by providing 
significant external incentives, like a free trade agreement or a stake in the Common Market, to 
the Ukrainian oligarchic clans to push for further institutional convergence. Taking into 
account the presence of the oligarchic clans in the parliament and the executive, these 
economic incentives could be very effective  
However, the ENP framework does not provide a firm commitment on the part of the EU, 
and the AP provides possibilities rather than concrete mechanisms and benefits. It is unlikely 
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that this will be sufficient to create a momentum for institutional convergence with the EU, as 
was the case with “Enlargement Europeanization”. External incentives supporting the domestic 
drivers of institutional reforms would be highly welcome in the present situation in Ukraine. 
While it is doubtful whether or not stable political conditions favoring reforms may be 
established in Ukraine by Tymoshenko’s government, a new enhanced agreement to replace 
the expiring PCA and new ENP AP are to be negotiated. Moreover, Ukraine has not only 
successfully completed the negotiations on WTO membership, it has begun negotiations with 
the EU on the FTA+. The challenge in these negotiations is that the incentives the EU provides 
are rather small compared to the accession process and thus have to be well targeted in order to 
be effective and generate some optimism that the bottom-up forces for institutional reform in 
Ukraine will be strengthened and that the current stalemate can be overcome.  
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1
 Europeanization is “a process in which states adopts EU rules” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier 2005). 
2
 A growing empirical literature stresses that “institutions matter” for sustainable economic growth (Rodrik 2003; 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005; Chhibber et al. 2006; Acemoglu and Johnson 2003). 
3
 Solana, Javier: A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy, Brussels 2003, p.14. 
4
 Apart from economic incentives, regional security may be an additional or even increasingly important incentive 
for institutional building. Thus, NATO membership also provides incentives. Empirical results confirm that apart 
from EU incentives, NATO membership has a positive impact on institution building in transition countries 
(Drautzburg, Melnykovska and Schweickert 2008).  
5
 Although it is difficult to measure the extent to which a civil society exists, the number of registered 
organizations and associations, and the percentage of citizens who are members of voluntary organizations and 
associations, are commonly used as a yardstick.  
6
 The rankings of the most influential persons in Ukraine’s politics and economy are periodically published by a 
few national journals and newspapers. Representatives of business groups have held the leading position in these 
ratings since before the Orange Revolution. See, Ranking of The Most Influential People of the Country. Hvardiya, 
Halytski Kontrakty, 2002-2005; Rating of the 200 Most Influential Ukrainians 2007, in: Focus 51(64), 21 
December 2007.  
7
 Relatives could be included in a clan, but relative relationships play a secondary role.  
8
 The patronage relationship between Pavlo Lazarenko, the former prime minister of Ukraine, and Yulia 
Tymoshenko, the former president of the United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU), ensured the monopoly 
position of this company on Ukraine’s gas market.  
9
 Defective democracies are political regimes, also categorized as “semi-authoritarian regimes” or “electoral 
authoritarian regimes” (Olcott and Ottaway 1999), in which limited forms of pluralism (i.e. elections, civil 
society) exist, but in which the other elements of democracy (i.e. accountability, checks and balances between 
state branches) do not function properly. 
10
 The judicial branch can not be considered an independent branch of state power because it is strongly influenced 
by the executive. 
11
 In Ukraine, the position of presidential advisor was held for a long time by oligarchs Vadym Volkov and 
Oleksandr Rabynovich. Businessman Andriy Derkach is also an example. In 1996, he was appointed presidential 
advisor on foreign trade and two years later he became the manager of Kuchma’s election team. 
12
 According to Kerstin Zimmer (2006), in the late 1990s, Ukrainian enterprises bought legislative laws (44 
percent of total), presidential decrees (37 percent of total), credits and preferences of the National Bank (approx. 
37 percent of total) and adjudications (21-26 percent of total). 
13
 The agrarian oligarchic clans had already existed in Soviet times and still influenced Ukraine’s politics through 
its own ‘Agrarian Party’ (Selyanska Partiya Ukrainy). The coal mining oligarchic clans obtained subsidies and 
blocked restructuring reforms of the mining sector by means of networking with the executive. In the 1990s, the 
coal ministry and government were strongholds of the Donbas-based oligarchic clan. Its position was supported by 
the miners’ strikes and by the coal enterprise directors and the Donbas regional elites. However, the influence of 
the agrarian and coal mining clans began to diminish already in Kuchma’s era. Cross-sector oligarchic clans took 
over the agrarian and coal clans’ influence in politics. 
14
 Such inner regional rivalry is exemplified by the rise and fall of the United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU), 
Tymoshenko’s clan stemming from the Dnipropetrovsk region. Flourishing during the period that Lazarenko was 
the prime minister, the company lost its monopoly in the Ukrainian gas market and its wealth after a new prime 
minister, Valeriy Pustovoitenko, a representative of another oligarchic clan that also came from the 
Dnipropetrovsk region, was appointed in 1997. The same regional origin of Pystovoitenko’s and Tymoshenko’s 
clans did not secure the financial imperia of UESU. Tymoshenko and the members of the executive board were 
accused of smuggling currency and natural gas, bribing, and the large-scale misappropriation of state property. 
15
 Coming to power in 1994, president Kuchma awarded the presidential administration with governmental 
powers. Correspondently, the value of the position in this state body increased for the oligarchic clans radically. 
The positions in the presidential administration (as well as in the government) offered opportunities to obtain 
information about privatization plans, to negotiate subsidies for enterprises and to obtain credits and licenses. The 
presidential administration, or “shadow government” as it was since then called, had wide executive powers and 
competed with the government. The offices of the head of the presidential administration and prime minister were 
objects to exchange between the Kyiv, the Kharkov, the Doneck and the Dnipropetrovsk clans. During Kuchma’s 
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presidency the governmental positions were filled by the representatives of the Dnipropetrovsk and the Doneck 
clans. The chieftains of the Kharkov (Jevheniy Kusnaryov) and the Kyiv (Viktor Medvedchuk) clans often became 
the heads of the presidential administration. 
16
 The “5 channel” and “Era” the broadcasting companies - loyal to the Orange forces media - were owned by the 
Ukrainian oligarchs. 
17
 The first “orange” coalition was created in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in 2005 and consisted of Our 
Ukraine Party, Bloc Yulia Tymoshenko and the Socialist Party. The first “orange” government of Tymoshenko 
was blamed for corruption and dissolved in the autumn of 2005. 
18
 Institutional convergence can be considered an institutional change to adjust institutions to certain institutional 
standards.  
19
 By globalization we mean trade in goods, financial flows, and global harmonization of rules and norms. 
20
 The type of rent might be another conditional variable. Connecting the ideas of Olson and Havrylyshyn implies 
that opening up a country may have different implications for rent seekers depending on the types of rents. Unlike 
non-renewable resources in isolated mining sectors, opening up has a direct impact on rents to be extracted from 
monopoly situations in the case of renewable resources or production sectors in general. The scarcity and 
worldwide demand for non-renewable resources limit the positive effects of globalization by pushing domestic 
rent-seekers to support institutional convergence towards global standards. In trade with non-renewable resources, 
openness has lost its power. 
21
 The end prices were also lower than the world prices because compensation for transit charges was included in 
the payment for energy resources. 
22
 The financial crisis in 1998 also marked the end of IMF “soft” credits. At the request of the IMF and because 
the Ukrainian government wanted to avoid financial full-fledge default, it undertook some market reforms and 
cancelled “soft budget constrains”. Thus, the most conservative part of the Ukrainian elite – the “red directors” - 
lost its rents in terms of subsidies and donations, and subsequently left the stage of the politics. “Red directors” 
were the former Communist party apparatchiks or directors of the Soviet state enterprises who actually ran state 
enterprises on a day-to-day basis. As products of the old system, these individuals kept control over their 
enterprises in the years of transition and were likely to attempt to frustrate any reform effort that limited their 
power. The external shock following the crisis of 1998 transmitted into successful economic and political reforms 
that squeezed their rent-seeking possibilities. 
23
 The importance of two pipelines going through Ukraine as a “high-value card” in the bargaining position of 
Ukraine vis-à-vis Russia diminished. In 1999, the Yamal-pipeline began to transport the Russian gas across 
Belarus and Poland, circumventing Ukraine. By 2010, Ukraine’s loss of geopolitical advantage in the transit of 
energy will be intensified by the completion of a pipeline running through the Baltic Sea and connecting Russia 
directly with Germany. 
24
 In 2004, Ukraine’s steel sector reached its highest level of capacity utilization: 95.4%, up from 52.1% in 1998. 
25
 The figure for FDI flows from the EU-27 includes one very large off-shore zone, Cyprus, which accounts for a 
substantial part of FDI into Ukraine.  
26
 From 1993 until 200, the EU lodged 43 anti-dumping cases against Ukrainian steel traders. 
27
 The decision whether the Ukrainian steel prices were “dumping” prices or not was defined by comparing 
Ukrainian steel prices to the calculated unit production costs and steel prices in a third country ”surrogate” that 
had the status of a full-fledged market economy. The calculated costs and prices were typically higher than 
Ukrainian ones. Thus, the EU introduced antidumping customs duty equal to the difference between the 
production costs of the third country and the production costs of the Ukrainian producers. 
28
 The creation of any deep regional integration with Russia is both rather unlikely to occur and unlikely to be of 
great help. Ukraine’s trade regime is determined by both CIS-wide arrangements and bilateral agreements. 
Numerous CIS-wide agreements (like the CIS Economic Union, CIS Free Trade Zone, CIS Common Agricultural 
Market, etc.) have failed to be fully implemented. After Ukraine joins the WTO, it seems that the feasibility of 
CIS agreements is rather low and likely any activities related to these agreements will be limited to an attempt to 
create a free trade area between CIS countries. In addition, Russia’s markets are still relevant for Ukraine, but, as 
the trade regime of the EU towards Russia is rather liberal, there is no contradiction between bilateral Ukraine-
Russian trade and EU integration. 
29
 The same does not apply to achieving some sort of FTA with the EU: FTAs with the EU usually preceded both 
WTO entry and the official EU application membership by several years. 
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30
 Andrew Rose (2004) estimated that WTO Accession has non-significant trade-creating effects, contrary to 
regional FTAs, which have strong significantly positive trade creating effects. That is probably the case due to the 
“lowest common denominator” constraints of the WTO Accession negotiation process, as opposed to 
regional/bilateral FTAs that usually go much deeper towards liberalization amongst their members. The EU is 
perhaps the most obvious example of the latter case. Igor Eremenko and Ekaterina Lisenkova (2004) share the 
same conclusion for Ukraine. 
31
 Press release. 2007. Press office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (CMU). 
32
 The calculations take into account all governmental measures in 2007. During this period, Ukraine has too 
governments: one of Yanukovych (September 2006-December 2007) and the other of Tymoshenko (since 
December 2007). Thus, these achievements could not be endowed to Tymoshenko’s government only. 
33
 The ENP tools to enhance reforms stemmed from the PCA and were sporadically complemented with 
Enlargement tools. Despite regime changes and transformation of Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential 
republic, the EU institutional linkages are almost the presidency- and executive-oriented (Gawrich et al. 2008). 
34
 The same unique character has the FTA incentive. 
